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Materials and Methods 
Surveys and samples 
Research indicates that answers to questions on perceived quality of life may depend on 
specific survey characteristics (1). To address the concern that bias might arise from survey 
sampling techniques, we tested our hypotheses across multiple surveys to assess robustness. This 
strategy also allowed us to perform our analyses across a wide range of countries and years. Our 
data sources were the World Values Surveys (WVS), European Social Survey (ESS), and the 
Latino Barometro (LB). These surveys consist of repeated cross-sectional datasets (i.e., a multi-
wave design where each wave includes randomly drawn respondents), being distinct from a 
longitudinal panel design. In all three surveys, random probability sampling was applied in face-
to-face interviews, resulting in several representative waves of data. These surveys were 
designed to enable cross-country comparisons of values, norms, and beliefs on a variety of 
topics. They share similar questions containing rich information about respondents’ religious 
affiliation and perceived quality of life, with multiple measures of well-being, self-reported 
health, and other individual characteristics relevant to the present research. This triangulation of 
surveys has successfully been used before in comparative research examining contextual effects 
on quality of life indicators (2). Our main analyses testing the effects of changes in religious 
diversity on quality of life were performed across different waves of the three surveys. For the 
mediation analysis we were restricted to ESS’s Wave 7 given that it is the only survey-wave 
containing individual-level data on both trust and intergroup contact.  
World Values Survey. This survey is a large cross-national, time series study covering a 
wide range of global contexts. It is comprised of the World Values Survey and the European 
Values Survey. Across six waves spanning 1981 to 2014 (depending on the country), it contains 
representative samples from almost 100 countries, representing around 90% of the world’s 
population. The minimum sample per country is 1,000 respondents and stratified random 
sampling was used to obtain representative national samples with interviews of almost 400,000 
individuals (www.woldvaluessurvey.org). 
European Social Survey. The ESS is a cross-national survey established in Europe in 2002. 
Random probability sampling was used to generate national representative samples from 36 
European countries and Israel. Countries are surveyed every two years and we used the data 
available from seven waves (from 2002 to 2014). Face-to-face interviews were conducted with 
around 350,000 respondents and Wave 7, which we used in our mediation analysis, included 21 
countries and about 40,000 individuals (www.europeansocialsurvey.org).  
Latino Barometro. The LB is an annual survey containing data from 18 Latin American 
countries. Nationally representative samples were collected from 1995 onwards and we used the 
data available at the time of our study (1995 – 2015, 18 waves of data), comprising around 
20,000 respondents representing more than 600 million people (www.latinobarometro.org).  
 
Control Variables 
Individual-level controls. We control for a wide range of relevant individual-level 
characteristics, including variables that have been shown to affect quality of life in prior research 
(3-8). To provide a thorough test of our hypotheses across surveys, we restricted our analyses to 
the use of variables that were present in all surveys and applied the same dummy variable coding 
schemes.  
Across the three surveys we included the following variables and coding: sex (1 = female), 
religious denomination, coded in 6 dummies with the reference group “no religion” (1 = Roman 
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Catholic; 2 = Protestant; 3 = Orthodox; 4 = Jewish; 5 = Muslim; 6 = Other), and employment 
relation, coded in 2 dummies with the reference group “Employee” (1 = Self-employed and 2 = 
Other). Marital status was coded in the WVS and ESS in 5 dummies with the reference group 
“married” (1 = Separated; 2 = Divorced; 3 = Widowed; 4 = Never married; 5 = Other). The LB 
had fewer categories and marital status was coded in 2 dummies with the reference group 
“married/living with partner” (1 = Single; 2 = Separated/Divorced/Widow).  
We also controlled for other continuous and ordinal variables on which we maintained the 
original coding: age (together with a quadratic term for age), level of religiosity, whether the 
person attends religious services (the LB did not have this variable), education, size of town (this 
variable was excluded from the WVS given that it was asked only in some countries, but a WVS 
analysis with or without this variable produced the same results), interest in politics, and 
generalized trust (this is an ordinal variable in the ESS and LB, but a dichotomous variable in the 
WVS with 1 “most people can be trusted” and 2 “can’t be too careful”).  
We also controlled for political views with a question pertaining to respondents’ 
endorsement of inequality in income levels in both the ESS and WVS. The LB did not have this 
question, so we used responses to a question about political views assessed on a left-right 
political scale. Subjective income was included as a control in analyses based on the ESS and LB 
(e.g., “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays with responses ranging from “1” living comfortably on present 
income and 4 “finding it very difficult on present income”). The WVS had an identical variable 
but it was asked only in a small number of countries and, for this reason, we assessed subjective 
income with responses to the question: “On this card is an income scale on which 1 indicates the 
lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country. We would like to know 
in what group your household is. Please, specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, 
salaries, pensions and other incomes that come in”. Responses were coded on a scale ranging 
from 1 “lowest group” to 10 “highest group”.  
Of importance, we included in our analyses individuals from all religious backgrounds and 
controlled for religious persuasion. Previous diversity research has favored excluding minority 
groups from analyses [for an exception, see (9)], but in our research all groups were included, 
given the broader scope of understanding how humans react to changes in religious diversity (for 
results divided by religious groups, see additional analyses).   
Country-level controls. To account for between-country variation we included a range of 
economic, social, and political measures known to influence the quality of life or correlate with 
religious diversity. These variables included country wealth, income inequality, government and 
political stability, and political conflict within countries (10-14). Country wealth was measured 
with the gross domestic product (GDP per capita in current US$) using Worldbank data. Income 
inequality was measured with Gini indices taken from Solt’s Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (15), which is based on United Nations data and improves on direct 
estimates of inequality by using a custom missing-data algorithm to render observations 
comparable to one another. Compared to Gini coefficients available from the World Bank, this 
dataset covered a greater proportion of countries.  
Government stability and internal political conflict were measured using the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which assesses risk along several dimensions and has been used to 
forecast financial, economic, and political risk. It was created in 1980 and provides a 
comprehensive and continuous measurement system permitting the comparison of risk between 
countries. The government stability component measures the government’s ability to carry out its 
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declared program and ability to stay in office. It is assessed by considering the following 
subcomponents: government unity, legislative strength, and popular support. Internal conflict 
indicates the level of political violence and its potential impact on governance and is created 
from information about civil wars, political violence, and civil disorder. Both measures range 
from 0 to 4, with a higher score indicating a higher risk of government instability and internal 
conflict. All country-level controls were matched to each country by year.  
Additional control variables used in the mediation analysis. In the mediation analysis we 
were restricted to one survey and could not make comparisons across surveys. For this reason, 
we decided to take full advantage of the rich individual measures in the ESS and expanded our 
list of control variables to better account for individual-level variation in the quality of life. Thus, 
in addition to the controls specified for the main analysis, we controlled for citizenship status as 
this might interfere with people’s reactions and perspectives about the country where they were 
interviewed. Since the size of one’s social networks likely influences the frequency of intergroup 
contact and quality of life, we controlled for the extent of social activity with answers to the 
question: “Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in 
social activities” (with answers that ranged from 1 “much less than most” to 5 “much more than 
most). In addition, we controlled for circumstances within one’s close social environment that 
might influence the quality of life, which were assessed from answers to seven questions: “Have 
you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the last 5 years?” 
(1 “yes”, 2 “no”); “Do you belong to a minority ethnic group?” (1 “yes”, 2 “no”); “Using this 
card, please tell me how often there was serious conflict between the people living in your 
household when you were growing up?” (1 “always” to 5 “never”); and “Using the same card, 
please tell me how often you and your family experienced severe financial difficulties when you 
were growing up?” (1 “always” to 5 “never”). 
At the country-level we controlled for the same variables as in our main analysis. However, 
in this analysis we did not use Solt’s GINI database and computed, instead, a dissimilarity index 
(16) using respondents’ educational distributions to indicate social inequality. The Solt’s 
database had some missing data and, given that our mediation analysis is restricted to a smaller 
sample size, we followed this strategy to preserve the original sample as much as possible. With 
this method we were able to preserve all the 21 countries in wave 7 of the ESS.  
 
Supplementary Text 
Additional Information about our Modeling Strategy 
Main analysis. We adopted a multilevel model specification to account for dependence due 
to the hierarchical structure of the proposed datasets (i.e., individuals nested within countries; 
17). As specified in our main text, religious diversity was disaggregated into a between-country 
coefficient (time-invariant) and a within-country coefficient (time-variant). For the country-level 
controls we followed the same approach and introduced each one of them twice: once as time-
variant, and the second time as time-invariant t [see in the main text equation 1]. We included in 
our equation a linear effect of time to account for the possibility of simultaneous but unrelated 
time trends in both our diversity coefficients and quality of life. In fact, we expect that in most 
countries, both religious diversity and quality of life increase over the years and including a 
control for time accounts for some of this unobserved heterogeneity.  
We preferred our model specification compared to other alternatives such as an ordered 
probit model because it has the advantage of accounting for individual unobserved heterogeneity. 
In support of our modeling strategy, research suggests that in models with ordinal variables 
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including many categories (as with our quality of life indicators), a linear specification is more 
reliable (17, 18).  
To analyze the effects of changes in religious diversity, we only included in our analyses 
countries that were surveyed more than once. At the individual-level, we coded all “don’t know”, 
“refuse to answer”, and no responses as missing values (the proportion of these responses was 
below 1% in all three surveys). The resulting total of missing values per survey was extremely 
low (WVS = 5%, ESS = 1%, LB = 6%). We performed our analyses using Mplus 8.0 (19) and to 
better deal with missing data we used full information maximum-likelihood estimates with 
robust standard errors (MLR), which allows estimation with missing data and produces less 
biased results than other methods [e.g., listwise deletion — see (20)]. This estimation method 
does not impute missing values but has the advantage of using all observed data (with imputation 
methods our results were maintained, see additional analyses).  
With the WVS our model specification resulted in an analysis comprised of 160,645 
respondents in 68 countries, and 142 country-waves (the mean number of observations per 
country was 2,362). The SEM multilevel model yielded a good fit as shown by the Comparative 
Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR; for within and between parts of the models) indices (CFI = 0.99; 
RMSEA = 0.003; SRMRwithin = 0.001; SRMRbetween = 0.039). With the ESS, our model 
specification resulted in an analysis containing 126,634 respondents in 27 countries, and 70 
country-waves (with the mean number of observations per country being 4,690) and a model 
with a good fit (CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.001; SRMRwithin = 0.001; SRMRbetween = 0.023). With 
the LB we retained in our analysis 51,401 respondents in 18 countries, and 71 country-waves 
(and a mean number of observations per country was 2,856). The SEM model also yielded a 
good fit to the data (CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.001; SRMRwithin = 0.001; SRMRbetween = 0.001). 
All results are reported in Tables S4, S5, and S6. 
 Mediation analysis. in this analysis, we extended our initial focus to include a test of both 
negative (i.e., lower generalized trust) and positive (i.e., increased intergroup contact) 
mechanisms whereby religious diversity could impact quality of life. In this way, it was possible 
to model the suppression of beneficial effects and facilitation of harmful effects that may push or 
pull in different directions, as well as to provide a socio-psychological explanation of the overall 
effects of religious diversity on quality of life. In this analysis we were restricted to one wave of 
the ESS and to preserve as much as possible the available data, missing country-level data values 
were imputed from the nearest available wave. With this strategy we preserved all 21 countries 
included in Wave 7 of the ESS. The resulting sample is identical in size to the LB sample and, as 
such, we followed the same modeling strategy. That is, instead of creating latent variables as in 
our main analyses, we standardized and averaged the individual responses to the questions about 
generalized trust, intergroup contact, and quality of life. These individual-level variables were 
then created at the higher level using the structural equation modeling latent variable approach as 
in the main analysis. With this procedure, fewer coefficients needed to be estimated in our 
model, providing more reliable estimates. Table S7 shows average scores of our variables per 
country. 
We allowed the paths between quality of life and all other variables to be freely estimated 
as well as those between generalized trust, intergroup contact, and the two religious diversity 
coefficients (time-variant and time-invariant). The model was adjusted for the individual- and 
country-level variables specified in the Measures section. Note that the country-level covariates 
(e.g., GDP) were entered twice, mirroring the procedure for the religious diversity coefficients. 
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This model specification comprised 33,719 respondents and 21 countries (with an average 
cluster size of 1,606) and yielded a good fit (CFI = 0.98, RMSEA = 0.025, SRMRwithin = 0.001; 
SRMRbetween = 0.016). The intra-class correlation (ICC) showed that 16% of the variance of 
intergroup contact was explained by contextual effects. These contextual effects explained 12% 
of the variance in the case of generalized trust and 6% for quality of life. Results of the short- 
and long-term effects of religious diversity are reported in Table S8. Mediation results are 
reported as indirect effects and a total indirect effect (Fig. S1). 
Additional Analyses 
 Measurement quality of our diversity variable. Our diversity measures were developed 
using individual data from the representative samples in the analyzed surveys. To test the 
accuracy of our estimation method, we compared our religious diversity scores with those of 
popular measures developed with different procedures. Perhaps the most popular diversity 
dataset is that of Alesina and colleagues (21), in which the authors computed religious diversity 
indices for 190 countries using the Herfindahl formula. Data on the proportion of religious 
groups in each country was extracted from the Encyclopedia Britannica and the Altas Narodov 
Mira. We compared our diversity data from the WVS with Alesina and colleagues’ data 
matching the year and country and found that both datasets were highly correlated (r = 0.81, P < 
0.001, n = 97).  
Another popular measure of religious diversity is the religious diversity index developed 
by the Pew Research Center (22). For this index, Pew used the Herfindahl formula with “(…) 
religious composition information from about 2,500 data sources, including censuses, 
demographic surveys, general population surveys and other studies – the largest project of its 
kind to date” (22, p. 51). We matched the Pew data with the closest available year for every 
given country and found that both datasets were highly correlated (r = 0.73, P < 0.001, n = 90). 
We note that Alesina’s data range from 1980 to 2002 matching earlier waves of the WVS, whilst 
the Pew data corresponds to 2010 and, as such, the reported correlation coefficients indicate high 
correlations across the multiple waves of our WVS data. 
Because there were fewer countries in the ESS and LB, we aggregated both and found 
our religious diversity measures to be highly correlated with Alesina’s data (Pearson’s r = 0.72, 
P < 0.001, n = 77), the Pew data (r = 0.48, P = 0.004, n = 34), and with our WVS estimates (r = 
0.88, P < 0.001, n = 90). Moreover, note that we analyzed data from three independent surveys 
that used different sampling procedures and provided their own sampling weights. If the 
estimated proportion of religious groups was inaccurate due to sampling bias or other limitations, 
finding such consistency across our results would be extremely unlikely. This consistency 
together with the reported high correlations with other datasets warrants confidence in our 
diversity measures.  
Measurement quality of our quality of life variable. This construct is a multidimensional 
concept with several different interpretations in the literature. It has been, for example, defined in 
terms of reported well-being (23), health status (24), or life satisfaction (25). Definitions and 
interpretations of the concept vary depending on the discipline and research under focus, but 
there is general agreement that quality of life cannot be reduced to a single factor. The World 
Health Organization defines quality of life as “an individual's perception of their position in life 
in the context of the culture and value systems in which they live and in relation to their goals, 
expectations, standards and concerns. It is a broad ranging concept affected in a complex way by 
the person's physical health, psychological state, personal beliefs, social relationships and their 
relationship to salient features of their environment” (26: p. 1). 
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To guide us in deciding which components of quality of life might be relevant to the 
current research, we investigated the theoretical reasons why religious diversity might influence 
people’s quality of life. Previous empirical work suggests that intergroup interactions can lead to 
a threatened social identity (27) and heightened anxiety (28). Other scholars found that just 
anticipating such interactions can induce concerns about being negatively viewed by an 
interaction partner (29). At least initially, intergroup interactions can exacerbate intergroup bias, 
producing heightened stress, anxiety, less positive emotions, and outgroup avoidance [for a 
meta-analysis, see (30)]. These effects have been demonstrated with behavioral, self-reported, 
and physiological measures (31, 32).  
These emotional effects can, in turn, influence one’s health. Brain circuits can be 
remodeled by stress in ways that affect anxiety, memory, mood, and decision-making and, 
although such changes have adaptive value in particular short-term contexts, their persistence 
can be maladaptive over the long run (33). Prolonged exposure to stress also causes changes in 
the brain and body that can lead to disease. Thus, changes in religious diversity and perceptions 
of religious threat may heighten stress and anxiety emerging from intergroup interactions, and 
can take a physiological toll over time leading to diminished well-being and poor health 
outcomes. This reasoning fits classic theorizing in epidemiology, which argues that, among 
multiple psychosocial factors, rapid social change and shifting social networks are key 
determinants of diminished health (34).  
To capture these effects, we assessed quality of life with multiple measures of well-being 
and self-reported health available from the surveys. Self-rated happiness, well-being, and health 
are, on their own, strong indicators of quality of life (35) and these three measures have been 
found to be highly correlated in the literature (36, 37). This was the case for the WVS (α = 0.65, 
with only one factor emerging that explained 59% of the variance) and the ESS (α = 0.73, with 
only one factor emerging that explained 66% of the variance). In the LB, where we were 
restricted to life satisfaction and health, we found a small but significant correlation between the 
two indicators (r = 0.21, P < 0.001, with only one factor emerging that explained 61% of the 
variance). In the mediation analysis, the questions about happiness, life satisfaction, and self-
reported health were standardized and then averaged. A higher score on this variable indicated 
better quality of life (α = 0.73, with only one factor emerging that explained 65% of the 
variance). 
 To better understand the metric properties of our quality of life latent construct, we 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis. In this analysis, we allowed the errors of the three 
manifest variables (i.e., life satisfaction, happiness, and perceived health) to correlate at the 
individual level and created a latent variable at the higher level. With the WVS, our 
measurement model revealed a good fit (CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.001; SRMRwithin = 0.001; 
SRMRbetween = 0.008) with item loadings being 0.79 or greater. The ESS showed similar results 
with a good fit (CFI = 0.99; RMSEA = 0.001; SRMRwithin = 0.001; SRMRbetween = 0.001) with 
item loadings being 0.73 or greater. As specified in our modeling strategy, the LB only contained 
two indicators (i.e., life satisfaction and health) and, as such, we did not create a manifest 
variable. However, we examined this measure’s metric quality by correlating scores from each 
country*wave with life expectancy at birth data from the World Bank. Life expectancy is often 
used as an objective indicator of quality of life and, in fact, the two measures were highly 
correlated (r = 0.433, P < 0.001, n = 70), suggesting that our measure is tapping into the desired 
construct. 
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 Main analysis with alternative diversity measures. To capture other facets of religious 
diversity and test the robustness of our findings, we drew on the biological sciences and 
computed two additional indices popular for measuring biodiversity. We used the Shannon 
diversity index (38), which is identical to the Herfindahl index, but puts relatively more weight 
on the number of individuals belonging to smaller groups [1]. This is a valuable measure because 
it reflects people’s common tendency to overestimate the number of minority group members in 
society (39).  
H = ∑ ln𝑅𝑖=1 𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑖
         [1] 
We also used the evenness index (40), which refers to how equal in size the different species in a 
particular ecosystem are [2]. According to this index, a society is most diverse when the different 
religious groups tend to be fewer and of a similar size. This is a useful measure because, in these 
cases, conflict between groups is more likely to occur (41). H’ is derived from the Shannon index 
and H’max is the highest possible value of H’ considering that that all groups are equally likely.       
𝐽′ =
𝐻′
𝐻′𝑚𝑎𝑥
      [2] 
 We then performed our main analyses and substituted the Herfindahl index by the 
Shannon and Evenness indices. As shown in Table S9, results with the Shannon index were 
identical to those with the Herfindahl index, underlining the robustness of our results. Analysis 
of the evenness index, however, revealed no effects of religious diversity.  
These findings suggest that it is the increase in size and in quantity of the minority 
religious groups (as captured by both Herfindahl and Shannon indices) that are motivating the 
negative impact of changes in religious diversity on quality of life. In contrast, having fewer 
religious groups of equal in size (i.e., evenness) does not affect quality of life. With these 
findings it is possible to better investigate in which contexts increases in religious diversity 
impact quality of life. These contexts likely include homogenous countries that are starting to 
become more diverse or countries that are already diverse with multiple minority religious 
groups increasing in size. In countries with fewer religious groups, but of similar size, increasing 
diversity in terms of the groups becoming more even in size has no immediate implications for 
individuals’ quality of life, perhaps because these changes are less visible, resulting in smaller 
shifts in individuals’ perceived immediate environment.  
Analyses controlling for additional contextual variables. In our diversity indices, we 
accounted for the proportion of individuals with different religious affiliations but did not 
include in these indices the proportion of secular individuals. Although we think this is the 
correct approach as secularity is not a form of religion, it is possible that the different levels of 
societies’ secularity could affect the identified relationship between religious diversity and 
quality of life. To test this possibility, we repeated our main analyses controlling for the 
proportion of secular individuals in each country, providing an estimate of a country’s secularity. 
Similar to our diversity indices, this measure was created from the individual data and, more 
specifically, we calculated the proportion of individuals claiming to have “no religion”. As 
shown in Table S10, results from these analyses confirmed our main predictions suggesting that 
secularism did not interfere with our findings. 
Other variables such as unemployment rate, life expectancy, population size, corruption 
and inflation have been though to affect quality of life and may affect the relationships described 
in our results (3, 4, 7, 8). To examine whether this is the case, we controlled for these additional 
variables. Data on unemployment rate, life expectancy, population size, and inflation were 
extracted from the World Bank, while data on corruption was taken from the International 
Country Risk Guide. These data were matched by country and year in the analyzed surveys. 
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Results from this analysis revealed that our more comprehensive models had higher predictive 
power than models in our main analysis, as shown by lower scores in the fit indicators (i.e., log-
likelihood, Akaike information criterion, and Bayesian information criterion) and lower 
proportion of unexplained variance. Table S11 shows that results were the same as those found 
in our main analysis, providing greater confidence about the consistency of our findings.  
Other researchers using an identical model specification to our main analysis (42) have 
entered into their models an interaction between average levels of the independent level (i.e., our 
religious diversity time-invariant coefficient) and time. This interaction indicates whether the 
effects of religious diversity on quality of life would vary as a function of specific points in time 
and we tested for this possibility. Results indicated that the average levels of religious diversity 
did not depend on a specific wave, with non-significant interaction terms in all surveys (WVS: b 
= -0.039, P = 0.480.; ESS: b = -0.054, P = 0.220; and LB: b = 0.001, P = 0.454). Across the 
three surveys, controlling for this interaction did not change any of our main results 
Analysis specific to religious groups. In our main analysis, we included all respondents in 
the surveys and controlled for religious affiliation. However, there is the possibility that 
individuals belonging to different religious groups may diverge in their reactions to changes in 
religious diversity. To test this possibility, we performed our analysis for Catholics and then 
separately for all other religious affiliations. We aggregated all other religions into one category, 
because most of the religious groups were too small in size to allow a reliable comparison. An 
exception were religious groups such as Muslims that in the WVS were similar in size to 
Catholics, but, given their geographic concentration, analysis would result in a significant 
reduction of the countries included in the analyses. As shown in Table S12, results from this 
analysis revealed the same effects for Catholics and the other remaining religious groups. The 
only exception was the group of Catholics in the ESS for whom the main result, although not 
approaching statistical significance, was in the same direction as all other results.  
Test of the main analysis with the one wave approach used with the ESS. For the 
mediation analysis with the ESS, we used the last available wave of individual data and modeled 
longer-term and short-term changes in religious diversity using country-level data estimated 
from previous waves. Specifically, we compared a model examining a longer-term change in 
religious diversity (i.e., change from Wave 1 to Wave 7) to a model examining short-term 
change (i.e., change between Wave 6 to Wave 7). To offer an alternative statistical approach to 
our main analysis, we replicated this method with the WVS and the LB. As with the ESS, in both 
surveys we only analyzed countries that provided individual data to the last wave of the WVS 
(wave 6, year 2010-14) and the LB (wave 17, year 2015) and used country-level data from wave 
1 to the last available wave to compute differences in these variables.  
With this approach, it is critical to have no missing data at the country-level in any of the 
waves because countries with missing values in one of these variables are omitted automatically 
in the analyses. Having a different array of countries in our models would render any comparison 
of effects of religious diversity unreliable. To address this concern, we followed the same 
approach we used with the ESS and substituted data from the nearest available wave. With the 
LB, as with the ESS, this approach was not problematic given that there were few missing cases. 
However, individual data on health were only available in five adjacent waves, not permitting us 
to test longer-term changes. To address this limitation, we used ‘life satisfaction’ as the only 
indicator of quality of life as this variable was available throughout the survey.  
With the WVS we also had to make some adjustments. First, at the country-level there 
are several missing cases for a variety of reasons: the WVS includes a wider range of countries, 
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of which some are poorly documented; the first waves only include a few countries and for this 
reason we cannot use individual data to estimate religious diversity; and data for the first waves 
was collected in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, a period that was poorly covered by our 
government stability and internal conflict indices. Substituting data from the nearest available 
wave would result in various countries having multiple replicated values and, for this reason, we 
used linear interpolation to estimate missing values.  
For both the WVS and LB, we included individual level controls from the main analysis, 
having to adapt some of them to variables that were available in the analyzed waves. In the 
WVS, these controls include sex, age, age squared, education (highest education level attained), 
income (scale of incomes and family saving during past year), interest in politics, political 
orientation, religious affiliation, marital status, employment status, religiosity, how often attend 
religious services, whether respondent is a member of a church or religious organization), and 
trust in others (generalized trust and other two trust items specific to the analyzed wave: trust in 
people of another religion and trust in people from another nationality).  
With the LB, we controlled for sex, age, age squared, education, income, size of town, 
political orientation, religious affiliation, marital status, employment status, religiosity, and 
generalized trust. In both surveys we adjusted for the same contextual variables used in the main 
analysis: GDP, the Gini coefficient, government stability, and internal conflict. We computed a 
series of models accounting for the shortest possible difference in religious diversity (i.e., from 
the last to the penultimate wave) to the longest possible difference (i.e., changes from the last to 
the first wave of the surveys). For each model, we controlled for levels of religious diversity as 
in the ESS analysis.  
The WVS analysis included the responses of 46,674 individuals and 41 countries, with an 
average of 1,138 respondents per country. The LB analysis included 11,647 respondents, 
distributed across 18 countries, with an average of 647 respondents per country. Results with 
both surveys indicated that short-term differences have a negative impact on quality of life and 
that this effect tends to become more positive (or null) as the gap between the last and the other 
waves increases (see Figs. S2 and S3). Note that both the WVS and LB diverge in several 
aspects and an important difference is the gaps between waves. The LB contains shorter gaps 
between waves, allowing for a more sensitive analysis of short-term effects, whilst the WVS has 
wider gaps and with its 30 years of data permits a better perspective on the longer-term effects of 
religious diversity. Results from both analyses were remarkably consistent with findings from 
our main analysis.  
Unrepresentative samples in the WVS. Some scholars have noted that the expansion of 
this survey to include developing countries resulted in a few unrepresentative samples (43). 
These countries are specified in the survey documentation and include the first waves of 
Argentina, Chile, China, India, Mexico, and Nigeria, where samples consisted of more educated 
respondents living in urban areas. Although some of these country-waves were not included in 
our analyses because they did not have scores in one of our country-level variables, we repeated 
our main analysis excluding the remaining country-waves. The resulting analysis comprised a 
total of 68 countries, 137 country-waves, and 155,145 respondents. Our findings with this survey 
were maintained such that changes in religious diversity had a negative association with quality 
of life (b = -0.390, P = 0.034). As in our main analysis, there were no effects of average levels of 
religious diversity on quality of life (b = 0.001, P = 0.995. Given that results were identical, we 
preferred to maintain these countries in our main analysis.  
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Additional analysis of the mediation effects of intergroup contact. To better ascertain the 
evolving nature of intergroup contact and its mitigating effects, we replicated our mediation 
analysis accounting for all possible gaps (i.e., gaps between wave 7 and all the remaining 
waves), examining the indirect effects involving intergroup contact. An analysis of these indirect 
effects (i.e., effects of changes in diversity via contact only and via contact and trust) suggests 
that the mitigating effects of contact only emerge after a 6-year gap (see Fig. S4). Specifically, 
from a 2- to 6-year gap, the indirect effects via intergroup contact and via intergroup contact and 
trust do not statistically differ from zero (Ps > 0.123). However, from an 8-year gap onwards, 
both indirect effects gradually increase in size and become statistically significant (8-year gap 
indirect effect via contact and via contact and trust: 0.049, SE = 0.021, P = 0.024 and 0.008, SE 
= 0.004, P = 0.029; 10-year gap indirect effect via contact and via contact and trust: 0.0046, SE = 
0.015, P = 0.003 and 0.007, SE = 0.003, P = 0.022; and the 12-year contact via contact and via 
contact and trust: 0.045, SE = 0.013, P = 0.001 and 0.007, SE = 0.002, P = 0.003). These 
positive indirect effects via contact completely neutralize any of the negative effects of religious 
diversity on quality of life (the total indirect effects were non-significant, Ps > 0.182). This 
analysis is important for understanding the timeframe at which these mechanisms evolve. 
Specifically, from the moment that religious diversity increases, it takes at least eight years 
before intergroup contact reaches a level sufficient to neutralise initial negative effects associated 
with these demographic changes. This eight-year timeframe is, of course, just a reference from 
European data, but our results with data from other regions support a similar timescale by 
showing that the negative effects of changes in religious diversity dissipate after a 6-year gap in 
the WVS (Fig. S2). With the LB we found that negative effects of religious diversity dissipate 
somewhat faster (i.e., after a 4-year gap, Fig. S3). This timeframe discrepancy may be due to 
contextual differences that may facilitate intergroup contact such as lower levels of segregation 
or discrimination. An understanding of these nuances falls beyond the aim of the present study.  
A final note about causality. We were restricted to computing our analyses using 
exclusively correlational data, limiting our inferences about causality. This limitation has been 
acknowledged by other researchers (44, 45), who have identified a dearth of longitudinal studies 
examining the effects of social diversity. As these authors recognize, this limitation is critical 
especially for within-country studies, where individuals favoring or avoiding social diversity 
may move between neighborhoods in order to match their preferences. This self-selection issue 
is, however, less relevant in our work given that it is relatively unlikely that someone would 
move to another country because of changes in religious diversity. 
In addition, if we inverted the causal relationship inferred in our reasoning, our results 
would show countries’ quality of life to be negatively associated with changes in religious 
diversity. This reverse causal explanation makes less theoretical sense as people are more likely 
to migrate to countries that offer better conditions. These conditions could be, for example, 
greater wealth, political stability, and absence of conflict, which we controlled for in our 
analyses. It would thus be expected that countries with higher levels of quality of life would 
attract immigration and increase their religious diversity, which this is the opposite of what is 
shown by our data.  
A more complex issue is that of the inverse causality of the proposed mechanisms in our 
mediation analysis. Although our hypothesis was based on a theoretical framework [i.e., contact 
hypothesis (46)] supported by more than 60 years of research, it is plausible the lower levels of 
trust emerging from changes in religious diversity may curb possibilities of future intergroup 
contact. To test this possibility, we ran our mediation model with the reverse causal relationship 
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between trust and intergroup contact (i.e., changes in religious diversity → trust → intergroup 
contact → quality of life; Fig. S5). The results from this analysis support our initial findings. We 
find that in a short-term analysis, changes in diversity are associated with lower trust, which in 
turn is associated with less intergroup contact and lower quality of life. In the long-term analysis, 
however, we find that this path is not statistically significant (Fig. S5), providing additional 
evidence for our argument that the long-term association involving intergroup contact is positive 
and attenuates initial negative effects of these demographic changes. In fact, if the initial short-
term effect of trust reducing intergroup contact could set the tone for future intergroup relations, 
we would observe, with time, more marked negative associations and this is not what is shown 
by our data. This perspective is in line, more generally, with recent developments contending 
that negative outcomes of initial intergroup contact tend to dissipate with time (47). 
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Table S1. Religious diversity average scores and specific scores of each wave of the World 
Values Survey.  
 
Country Average 
diversity 
W1 
(1981-84) 
W2 
(1990-94) 
W3 
(1995-98) 
W4  
(1999-04) 
W5  
(2005-08) 
W5.5 
(2008) 
W6  
(2010-14) 
Albania 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Rp. 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
G. Britain 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Jordan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Lxmbourg 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Netherlands 
N. Zealand 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Pakistan 
0.4506 
0.1960 
0.0659 
0.6113 
0.1727 
0.2426 
0.1218 
0.4058 
0.2988 
0.5703 
0.3082 
0.6480 
0.2335 
0.0607 
0.3625 
0.1628 
0.0523 
0.4967 
0.1744 
0.1767 
0.5291 
0.4659 
0.0524 
0.4242 
0.0754 
0.3413 
0.1330 
0.0947 
0.3640 
0.0706 
0.0166 
0.2594 
0.0593 
0.6795 
0.1345 
0.1250 
0.5759 
0.2228 
0.0788 
0.0089 
0.5876 
0.6770 
0.5451 
0.1118 
0.2583 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.0942 
- 
- 
0.5428 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.0599 
- 
0.6087 
0.0857 
0.5061 
0.3386 
- 
0.4210 
0.0491 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.0496 
0.0142 
0.2737 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.1562 
- 
- 
0.5296 
- 
- 
0.0749 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.1487 
- 
0.0634 
0.2101 
0.3490 
0.5541 
0.2954 
0.7109 
- 
- 
- 
0.2308 
0.0460 
- 
0.0568 
0.1131 
0.5089 
0.3378 
- 
0.4110 
0.0679 
0.1993 
- 
- 
- 
0.0572 
0.0290 
0.2707 
- 
0.6876 
0.1462 
- 
- 
0.1268 
- 
- 
0.5013 
- 
- 
0.0590 
- 
0.4394 
0.1822 
0.0477 
0.5257 
- 
0.2209 
- 
- 
0.3441 
- 
0.3232 
- 
0.1818 
0.0722 
- 
0.0948 
- 
0.5097 
0.1444 
- 
0.4925 
- 
- 
0.4124 
- 
0.3306 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.2947 
- 
0.6741 
0.1493 
- 
- 
0.3468 
0.0169 
- 
- 
0.3752 
- 
0.1308 
- 
0.4987 
0.1840 
- 
- 
0.1532 
0.2462 
0.1450 
- 
0.2837 
0.5943 
0.3184 
0.6806 
- 
0.0333 
0.5079 
- 
0.0542 
- 
0.0697 
0.1431 
0.5449 
0.4387 
0.0450 
0.4115 
0.0932 
0.3674 
0.1310 
0.0324 
0.5417 
0.0699 
0.0122 
0.2726 
0.0845 
0.6821 
0.1261 
0.0644 
- 
0.1588 
0.1130 
0.0000 
0.5638 
- 
0.4408 
- 
0.4020 
0.4136 
0.2002 
0.0799 
0.6191 
0.2162 
0.2454 
0.1843 
0.4680 
0.2224 
0.5899 
0.3459 
0.6826 
0.2617 
0.0767 
0.5148 
- 
0.0492 
- 
0.1071 
0.3047 
0.5233 
0.6785 
0.0598 
0.3886 
0.0911 
0.3455 
0.1350 
0.1569 
0.5304 
0.1055 
0.0112 
0.2651 
0.0346 
0.6741 
0.1162 
0.1856 
0.6036 
0.2171 
0.1088 
0.0116 
0.6839 
0.8077 
- 
0.1403 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.2950 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.0647 
- 
- 
- 
0.0599 
0.2369 
0.5412 
0.5358 
- 
0.5004 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.0764 
- 
0. 5554 
- 
- 
0.1540 
- 
- 
0.2730 
0.0703 
0.6890 
- 
0.2578 
- 
0.5395 
- 
- 
0.2580 
0.5178 
0.3566 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.4836 
- 
- 
0.5869 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.4640 
- 
- 
0.0199 
- 
- 
0.1796 
0.0588 
- 
- 
- 
0.5481 
0.2681 
- 
0.0149 
0.6914 
0.8480 
0.6494 
- 
0.1145 
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Country 
Average 
diversity 
W1 
(1981-84) 
W2 
(1990-94) 
W3 
(1995-98) 
W4  
(1999-04) 
W5  
(2005-08) 
W5.5 
(2008) 
W6  
(2010-14) 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russia 
Serbia 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
U. States 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
Zimbabwe 
0.2620 
0.3352 
0.0414 
0.0786 
0.1916 
0.2085 
0.2592 
0.7739 
0.2458 
0.1198 
0.6744 
0.0437 
0.1324 
0.5578 
0.6500 
0.0599 
0.0095 
0.3123 
0.6397 
0.4336 
0.1657 
0.5550 
0.5724 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.5996 
0.0245 
0.0584 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.5005 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.0477 
0.0502 
0.1035 
0.3044 
- 
- 
0.1952 
0.0925 
0.7139 
0.0330 
0.1292 
0.5262 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.6226 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.2009 
0.2783 
0.0496 
- 
0.1613 
0.1858 
0.2885 
- 
0.2749 
0.1159 
0.6777 
0.0514 
0.1474 
0.5172 
0.5381 
- 
0.0246 
0.1936 
0.6609 
0.3323 
0.1563 
- 
- 
0.2231 
0.3431 
0.0191 
0.0660 
0.2012 
0.1552 
0.2618 
0.7456 
0.2803 
- 
0.6987 
0.0508 
0.0814 
- 
- 
 
0.0132 
0.3641 
0.7112 
- 
0.1751 
0.5828 
0.7614 
0.3220 
- 
0.0642 
0.1197 
0.2326 
0.1909 
0.2272 
- 
0.1977 
0.1570 
0.6840 
0.0206 
0.1741 
0.5631 
0.6716 
0.0561 
0.0015 
0.2196 
0.6600 
0.4139 
- 
0.5271 
- 
- 
- 
0.0414 
- 
0.2097 
0.1713 
- 
- 
- 
0.1295 
- 
- 
0.1278 
0.6246 
- 
- 
0.0043 
0.5273 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.3019 
0.3841 
0.0263 
- 
0.2410 
0.2434 
- 
0.8022 
- 
0.1398 
0.6726 
0.0821 
0.2086 
- 
0.7404 
0.0638 
0.0038 
0.2568 
0.6832 
0.5547 
- 
- 
0.3835 
Note. The European Values Survey provided additional Wave 5 individual data. These data were 
collected in the last year of Wave 5 and provided additional data to some countries that were 
already in that wave of the WVS between 2005/06. So we could use as much data as possible, we 
coded the additional data from the EVS as Wave 5.5 given that these countries were surveyed in 
the last year of Wave 5. Colombia, Mexico, and Slovenia also provided additional 1998 data and 
were coded as Wave 3.5. The religious diversity index scores for these countries are not depicted 
in the table and were 0.1337, 0.2855, and 0.0836 respectively.  
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Table S2. Religious diversity average scores and specific scores for each wave of the European 
Social Survey. 
 
Country Average 
diversity 
W1 
(2002-03) 
W2 
(2004-05) 
W3 
(2006-07) 
W4  
(2008-09) 
W5  
(2010-11) 
W6  
(2012-13) 
W7 
(2013-14) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Czech Rp.  
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
G. Britain 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Israel 
Lxmbourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Russia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
0.2313 
0.2969 
0.0338 
0.2491 
0.1668 
0.5106 
0.1055 
0.3311 
0.5924 
0.5810 
0.0810 
0.4199 
0.1262 
0.3070 
0.4221 
0.6411 
0.2240 
0.0313 
0.0750 
0.2593 
0.3066 
0.1457 
0.1243 
0.3292 
0.5933 
0.0236 
0.3100 
- 
0.2172 
- 
0.2556 
0.1451 
- 
0.0797 
- 
0.5929 
0.5264 
0.0840 
0.4239 
0.0944 
0.2891 
0.4210 
0.6463 
0.2263 
0.0284 
0.0552 
- 
- 
0.1269 
0.0576 
0.2895 
0.5478 
- 
- 
0.1993 
0.2363 
- 
0.2205 
0.1355 
0.5928 
- 
- 
0.5940 
- 
0.0842 
- 
0.0739 
- 
0.4231 
0.6107 
0.2535 
0.0289 
0.0556 
- 
0.3539 
0.1224 
0.1155 
0.2399 
0.5698 
0.0243 
0.2940 
0.1841 
0.2129 
- 
- 
0.1426 
0.5106 
0.0710 
0.3004 
0.5700 
- 
- 
0.4710 
0.1227 
- 
- 
0.6658 
0.2050 
0.0249 
0.0574 
0.2565 
0.3156 
0.1459 
0.1167 
0.2978 
0.5828 
- 
0.3407 
- 
0.2900 
0.0214 
0.2550 
0.1529 
0.5133 
0.0823 
0.2816 
0.5791 
0.5319 
0.0727 
0.4195 
0.1589 
0.2894 
- 
0.6307 
0.1747 
0.0385 
0.0728 
0.2595 
0.2772 
0.1566 
0.1289 
0.3170 
0.6167 
0.0229 
0.3005 
- 
0.3253 
0.0205 
0.1793 
0.1858 
0.5549 
0.0989 
0.3504 
0.5997 
0.6111 
0.0833 
0.4141 
0.1483 
0.3142 
- 
0.6248 
0.2264 
0.0435 
0.0967 
0.2202 
0.2923 
0.1197 
0.1368 
0.3623 
0.6088 
- 
0.3136 
- 
0.3825 
0.0594 
0.2850 
0.1971 
0.4865 
0.1365 
0.3589 
0.6063 
0.6205 
- 
0.4028 
0.1565 
0.3342 
- 
0.6476 
0.2551 
0.0247 
0.0851 
0.3009 
0.2940 
0.1558 
0.1530 
0.3941 
0.6050 
- 
0.3010 
0.3035 
0.4136 
- 
0.2993 
0.2086 
0.4058 
0.1645 
0.3642 
0.6046 
0.6150 
- 
0.3883 
0.1286 
0.3080 
- 
0.6616 
0.2270 
0.0302 
0.1024 
- 
- 
0.1923 
0.1615 
0.4040 
0.6222 
- 
- 
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Table S3. Religious diversity average scores and specific scores for each wave of the Latino Barometro.  
Note. Waves 1, 2, 4, and 7 did not provide data on any of our outcome indicators and were not included in the analyses. 
Country Average 
diversity 
W3 
(1997) 
W5 
(2000) 
W6 
(2001) 
W8  
(2003) 
W9 
(2004) 
W10  
(2005) 
W11  
(2006) 
W12 
(2007) 
W13 
(2008) 
W14 
(2009) 
W15 
(2010) 
W16 
(2011) 
W17 
(2013) 
W18 
(2015) 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dom. Rp. 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
0.1990 
0.3134 
0.4405 
0.3446 
0.2219 
0.3900 
0.3249 
0.2101 
0.5062 
0.5175 
0.5177 
0.1907 
0.4715 
0.3267 
0.1619 
0.2870 
0.3203 
0.2050 
0.1664 
0.2188 
0.4434 
0.2574 
0.1683 
0.2782 
- 
0.1637 
0.5680 
0.5944 
0.3952 
0.2673 
0.3016 
0.1931 
0.1917 
0.1701 
0.2555 
0.1026 
0.1853 
0.3595 
0.4627 
0.3255 
0.1936 
0.3034 
- 
0.1949 
0.5100 
0.5167 
0.5019 
0.0741 
0.3149 
0.2575 
0.1176 
0.2122 
0.2227 
0.1545 
0.2008 
0.3037 
0.4161 
0.3277 
0.2217 
0.3397 
- 
0.1297 
0.4582 
0.5084 
0.4429 
0.2593 
0.3609 
0.3511 
0.1451 
0.1663 
0.2250 
0.1499 
0.2082 
0.3518 
0.4243 
0.3429 
0.1176 
0.3673 
- 
0.1937 
0.4746 
0.5006 
0.5174 
0.1621 
0.5076 
0.3272 
0.1623 
0.2934 
0.2774 
0.1198 
0.1922 
0.3511 
0.4243 
0.3185 
0.0988 
0.4028 
0.3424 
0.1889 
0.4935 
0.4822 
0.5104 
0.1583 
0.4505 
0.3059 
0.1649 
0.3358 
0.2844 
0.1606 
0.1670 
0.3325 
0.4254 
0.3597 
0.2259 
0.3994 
0.3612 
0.2092 
0.4844 
0.4878 
0.5361 
0.2448 
0.4739 
0.2845 
0.1796 
0.2986 
0.3060 
0.1525 
0.1568 
0.2926 
0.4297 
0.3495 
0.2448 
0.4460 
0.2936 
0.2033 
0.4701 
0.4765 
0.5239 
0.1138 
0.4856 
0.3484 
0.1733 
0.2773 
0.3502 
0.2804 
0.1899 
0.2921 
0.4210 
0.4039 
0.2440 
0.3871 
0.2206 
0.2092 
0.5527 
0.5023 
0.5261 
0.2081 
0.5147 
0.3080 
0.1705 
0.3705 
0.3315 
0.3031 
0.2149 
0.3494 
0.4065 
0.3324 
0.1169 
0.4109 
0.2114 
0.2580 
0.4936 
0.5100 
0.5454 
0.2038 
0.5100 
0.3130 
0.1702 
0.3174 
0.3476 
0.2998 
0.2119 
0.2708 
0.4722 
0.3038 
0.2572 
0.4261 
0.2629 
0.2123 
0.4864 
0.5130 
0.5045 
0.1820 
0.5044 
0.3271 
0.1437 
0.2807 
0.3779 
0.1265 
0.2113 
0.3267 
0.4530 
0.3849 
0.2935 
0.4008 
0.2303 
0.2133 
0.4959 
0.5000 
0.4965 
0.1853 
0.5168 
0.3302 
0.1501 
0.3096 
0.3195 
0.2317 
0.2254 
0.2816 
0.4449 
0.3653 
0.2973 
0.4179 
0.4008 
0.2321 
0.5197 
0.5278 
0.5195 
0.1788 
0.5130 
0.3743 
0.1317 
0.3104 
0.3219 
0.2386 
0.1982 
0.3118 
0.4529 
0.3701 
0.3204 
0.4492 
0.4197 
0.2573 
0.5246 
0.6006 
0.6247 
0.2218 
0.5779 
0.3895 
0.1663 
0.3133 
0.4246 
0.2514 
0.2574 
0.3447 
0.4910 
0.3823 
0.3068 
0.4307 
0.5060 
0.2751 
0.5549 
0.5243 
0.6028 
0.2106 
0.5698 
0.4645 
0.1993 
0.3630 
0.4397 
0.2984 
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Table S4. Main analysis with the World Values Survey.  
 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Multi-level structural equation model 
Without control 
variables 
Life 
Satisfaction 
Self-reported 
Health 
Happiness 
Within level 
coefficients 
Sex 
Age 
Age2 
Education 
Subjective income 
Interest in politics 
Political views 
Religion: ref. no religion 
   Roman Catholic 
   Protestant 
   Orthodox 
   Jewish 
   Muslim 
   Other religion 
Marital status: ref. married 
   Separated 
   Divorced 
   Widowed 
   Never married 
   Other  
Employment status: ref. employed 
   Self-employed 
   Other  
Attend Religious services  
Level of religiosity 
Generalized trust 
Size of town 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.113 (0.027)*** 
-0.061 (0.005)*** 
6.023 (0.502)*** 
0.032 (0.009)** 
0.493 (0.033)*** 
0.020 (0.016) 
-0.047 (0.005)*** 
 
-0.020 (0.042) 
0.101 (0.048)* 
-0.099 (0.046)* 
-0.147 (0.117) 
-0.083 (0.071) 
-0.001 (0.048) 
 
-0.738 (0.058)*** 
-0.551 (0.039)*** 
-0.512 (0.037)*** 
-0.392 (0.032)*** 
-0.165 (0.049)*** 
 
-0.033 (0.035) 
-0.105 (0.025)*** 
0.034 (0.005)*** 
0.151 (0.028)*** 
0.322 (0.036)*** 
N/A 
-0.055 (0.011)*** 
-0.021 (0.002)*** 
0.703 (0.242)** 
0.032 (0.003)*** 
0.125 (0.006)*** 
0.018 (0.004)*** 
-0.006 (0.001)*** 
 
-0.014 (0.016) 
0.030 (0.017) 
-0.054 (0.018)** 
-0.029 (0.059) 
0.013 (0.025) 
-0.019 (0.016) 
 
-0.109 (0.022)*** 
-0.058 (0.014)*** 
-0.120 (0.015)*** 
-0.046 (0.008)*** 
-0.039 (0.015)** 
 
0.005 (0.011) 
-0.112 (0.012)*** 
0.012 (0.002)*** 
-0.002 (0.009) 
0.131 (0.008)*** 
N/A 
0.043 (0.009)*** 
-0.020 (0.001)*** 
1.725 (0.135)*** 
0.012 (0.003)*** 
0.111 (0.008)*** 
0.011 (0.005)* 
-0.009 (0.001)*** 
 
-0.019 (0.011) 
0.022 (0.018) 
-0.055 (0.017)** 
-0.097 (0.029)** 
-0.018 (0.030) 
0.003 (0.015) 
 
-0.302 (0.019)*** 
-0.254 (0.016)*** 
-0.263 (0.014)*** 
-0.187 (0.012)*** 
-0.086 (0.014)*** 
 
-0.001 (0.009) 
-0.017 (0.008)* 
0.012 (0.002)*** 
0.052 (0.009)*** 
0.091 (0.010)*** 
N/A 
   Quality of life (latent variable) 
 
Between 
level 
coefficients 
Herfindahl (average) 
Herfindahl (change) 
 
Wave 
GDP (average) 
GDP (change) 
GINI (average) 
GINI (change) 
Government Stability (average) 
Government Stability (change) 
Internal Conflict (average) 
Internal Conflict (change) 
0.298 (0.319) 
0.042 (0.313) 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.006 (0.077) 
-0.393 (0.178)* 
 
0.027 (0.013)* 
0.820 (0.214)*** 
0.167 (0.205) 
0.027 (0.128) 
0.012 (0.006)* 
-0.045 (0.026) 
0.001 (0.007) 
-0.006 (0.021) 
0.015 (0.011) 
Unexplained 
variance 
 0.608 (0.110) 0.018 (0.006) 
Fit 
indicators     
Loglikelihood 
Akaike information criterion (AIC)  
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
41.092 
4 038 048 
4 038 203 
8.583 
1 336 884 
1 337 834 
Sample  
size 
Countries; country-waves; 
respondents 
105; 327; 
465,943 
68; 142;  
160,645 
Note. * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001 
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Table S5. Main analysis with the European Social Survey.  
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Multi-level structural equation model 
Without 
control 
variables 
Life 
Satisfaction 
Self-reported 
Health 
Happiness 
Within level 
coefficients 
Sex 
Age 
Age2 
Education 
Subjective income 
Interest in politics 
Political views 
Religion: ref. no religion 
   Roman Catholic 
   Protestant 
   Orthodox 
   Jewish 
   Muslim 
   Other religion 
Marital status: ref. married 
   Separated 
   Divorced 
   Widowed 
   Never married 
   Other 
Employment status: ref. employed 
   Self-employed 
   Other  
Attend Religious services  
Level of religiosity 
Generalized trust 
Size of town 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.099 (0.020)*** 
-0.070 (0.006)*** 
6.165 (0.524)*** 
0.005 (0.003) 
0.810 (0.047)*** 
0.002 (0.014) 
-0.098 (0.013)*** 
 
0.002 (0.033) 
0.043 (0.033) 
-0.213 (0.051)*** 
-0.568 (0.105)*** 
-0.095 (0.098) 
-0.094 (0.048) 
 
-0.703 (0.066)*** 
-0.410 (0.044)*** 
-0.447 (0.029)*** 
-0.399 (0.028)*** 
N/A 
 
0.093 (0.016)*** 
0.013 (0.061) 
0.032 (0.008)*** 
0.052 (0.007)*** 
0.138 (0.006)*** 
-0.034 (0.009)*** 
-0.054 (0.013)*** 
-0.023 (0.002)*** 
0.386 (0.172)* 
0.019 (0.002)*** 
0.187 (0.007)*** 
0.011 (0.004)** 
-0.020 (0.004)*** 
 
0.001 (0.016) 
0.038 (0.016)* 
-0.057 (0.015)*** 
-0.077 (0.029)** 
0.005 (0.044) 
-0.043 (0.023) 
 
-0.026 (0.017) 
-0.028 (0.012)** 
-0.063 (0.013)*** 
-0.085 (0.010)*** 
N/A 
 
0.057 (0.013)*** 
0.040 (0.023) 
0.021 (0.004)*** 
-0.007 (0.002)** 
0.031 (0.002)*** 
0.001 (0.004) 
0.108 (0.019)*** 
-0.064 (0.005)*** 
5.239 (0.368)*** 
0.007 (0.003)* 
0.582 (0.030)** 
0.040 (0.017)** 
-0.045 (0.012)* 
 
-0.052 (0.025)** 
0.040 (0.026)* 
-0.183 (0.030)* 
-0.414 (0.055) 
-0.154 (0.053) 
-0.083 (0.047)* 
 
-0.787 (0.073)*** 
-0.559 (0.046)*** 
-0.788 (0.037)*** 
-0.556 (0.032)*** 
N/A 
 
0.053 (0.023)* 
0.006 (0.061) 
0.010 (0.008)** 
0.054 (0.007)*** 
0.109 (0.005)** 
-0.024 (0.009)** 
   Quality of life (latent variable) 
 
Between 
level 
coefficients 
Herfindahl (average) 
Herfindahl (change) 
 
Wave 
GDP (average) 
GDP (change) 
GINI (average) 
GINI (change) 
Government Stability (average) 
Government Stability (change) 
Internal Conflict (average) 
Internal Conflict (change) 
0.443 (0.760) 
-0.467 (0.610) 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.109 (0.114) 
-1.073 (0.412)** 
 
0.033 (0.015)* 
0.512 (0.189)** 
-0.300 (0.173) 
0.000 (0.005) 
-0.006 (0.005) 
0.002 (0.031) 
-0.007 (0.014) 
-0.012 (0.020) 
0.046 (0.032) 
Unexplained 
variance 
 0.994 (0.227) 0.009 (0.003) 
Fit indicators Loglikelihood 
Akaike information criterion (AIC)  
Bayesian inform. criterion (BIC) 
81.318 
3 559 537 
3 559 687 
11.275 
1 246 940 
1 247 564 
Sample  
size 
Countries; country-waves; 
Respondents 
36; 167; 
321,898 
27; 70; 
126,634 
Note. * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001 
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Table S6. Main analysis with the Latino Barometro.  
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 Multi-level structural 
equation model 
Without control 
variables 
Quality of life  
(life satisfaction  
and health) 
Within level 
coefficients 
Sex 
Age 
Age2 
Education 
Subjective income 
Interest in politics 
Political views 
Religion: ref. no religion 
   Roman Catholic 
   Protestant 
   Orthodox 
   Jewish 
   Muslim 
   Other religion 
Marital status: ref. married 
   Single 
   Separated/Divorced/Widow 
Employment status: ref. employed 
   Self-employed 
   Other 
Attend Religious services  
Level of religiosity 
Generalized trust 
Size of town 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.076 (0.012)*** 
-0.020 (0.002)*** 
1.515 (0.251)*** 
0.049 (0.005)*** 
0.259 (0.014)*** 
0.027 (0.008)** 
0.014 (0.003)*** 
 
0.149 (0.099) 
0.140 (0.120) 
N/A 
0.167 (0.109) 
N/A 
0.143 (0.110) 
 
-0.034 (0.018) 
-0.095 (0.017)*** 
 
-0.070 (0.013)*** 
-0.077 (0.012)*** 
N/A 
0.070 (0.009)*** 
0.114 (0.016)*** 
0.004 (0.005) 
Between 
level 
coefficients 
Herfindahl (average) 
Herfindahl (change) 
 
Wave 
GDP (average) 
GDP (change) 
GINI (average) 
GINI (change) 
Government Stability (average) 
Government Stability (change) 
Internal Conflict (average) 
Internal Conflict (change) 
-0.176 (0.459) 
0.036 (0.531) 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.294 (0.518) 
-1.473 (0.634)* 
 
0.008 (0.020) 
0.018 (0.027) 
0.010 (0.018) 
-0.030 (0.020) 
-0.086 (0.035)* 
0.056 (0.134) 
0.024 (0.026) 
-0.031 (0.067) 
-0.042 (0.068) 
Unexplained 
variance 
 0.100 (0.026) 0.060 (0.011) 
Fit indicators Loglikelihood 
Akaike information criterion (AIC)  
Bayesian inform. criterion (BIC) 
12.089 
275 743 
275 790 
3.198 
139 255 
139 538 
Sample  
size 
Countries; country-waves; 
respondents 
18; 89; 
97,361 
18; 71; 
51,401 
Note. * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001 
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Table S7. Main variables of the mediation analyses (ESS wave 7).   
Note. Values for contact, trust, and quality of life indicate the average scores of these variables 
per country after being adjusted for all individual-level controls and centered such that a value of 
0 indicates the average levels of the whole sample.  
 
 
  Religious diversity 
(Herfindahl) 
  Contact Trust Quality of 
Life 
Country  W1 W6 W7   W7 W7 W7 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Rp.  
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
G. Britain 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Israel 
Lithuania 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
 0.2383 
0.2173 
0.2556 
0.1451 
0.5928 
0.0797 
0.3004 
0.5929 
0.5264 
0.4239 
0.0945 
0.2891 
0.1740 
0.6463 
0.2263 
0.0284 
0.0552 
0.1269 
0.0576 
0.2895 
0.5478 
0.3036 
0.3826 
0.2850 
0.1971 
0.4865 
0.1365 
0.3589 
0.6063 
0.6205 
0.4028 
0.1565 
0.3342 
0.1212 
0.6476 
0.2551 
0.0247 
0.0851 
0.1558 
0.1530 
0.3941 
0.6050 
0.3035 
0.4136 
0.2993 
0.2086 
0.4058 
0.1645 
0.3642 
0.6046 
0.6150 
0.3883 
0.1286 
0.3080 
0.1380 
0.6616 
0.2270 
0.0302 
0.1024 
0.1923 
0.1615 
0.4040 
0.6222 
  0.4125 
0.4952 
-0.8967 
0.4544 
-0.5444 
-0.3382 
0.3383 
0.5357 
0.7485 
-0.8283 
0.4635 
-1.7765 
-1.1056 
0.6432 
0.8613 
-1.9928 
-0.1248 
0.2068 
0.3265 
1.3686 
0.7530 
-0.0904 
-0.2204 
-0.6436 
1.0709 
0.3248 
1.0183 
-0.2882 
-0.0445 
0.3317 
-0.7504 
0.2611 
-0.1177 
-0.4221 
0.5341 
0.8401 
-1.1572 
-0.8017 
-0.6033 
-0.4261 
0.7966 
0.3879 
0.0763 
0.1054 
-0.0425 
0.2304 
-0.1187 
0.2323 
-0.2239 
-0.0240 
0.0581 
-0.2791 
0.0985 
0.2601 
-0.3507 
0.0692 
0.1048 
-0.0675 
-0.2496 
-0.2054 
-0.0520 
0.1448 
0.2334 
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Table S8. ESS (wave 7) short- and long-term effects of religious diversity. 
 
 
 
 
   
 
Multi-level structural equation model 
  
Variables 
Without control 
variables 
Trust Intergroup  
contact 
Quality of  
life 
Within level 
coefficients 
Sex 
Age 
Age2 
Education 
Subjective income 
Political views (left-right scale) 
Religion: ref. no religion 
   Roman Catholic 
   Protestant 
   Orthodox 
   Jewish 
   Muslim 
   Other religion 
Marital status: ref. married 
   Separated 
   Divorced 
   Widowed 
   Never married 
Employment status: ref. employed 
   Self-employed 
   Other 
Attend religious services  
Level of religiosity 
Size of town 
Take part in social activities 
Victim of burglary/assault 
Ethnic minority 
Citizen of country 
Conflict in household 
Financial difficulties 
Intergroup contact 
Generalized trust  
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.085 (0.021)*** 
0.004 (0.001)*** 
- 
0.108 (0.007)*** 
0.293 (0.017)*** 
-0.007 (0.011) 
 
-0.151 (0.036)*** 
0.049 (0.028) 
-0.301 (0.065)*** 
-0.074 (0.099) 
-0.341 (0.090)*** 
-0.321 (0.088)*** 
 
-0.317 (0.188)** 
-0.151 (0.032)*** 
-0.054 (0.031) 
-0.035 (0.027) 
 
0.015 (0.043) 
-0.055 (0.086) 
0.025 (0.010)* 
0.036 (0.005)*** 
-0.002 (0.013) 
0.169 (0.012)*** 
0.197 (0.027)*** 
0.295 (0.044)*** 
0.050 (0.065) 
0.084 (0.014)*** 
0.057 (0.012)*** 
0.024 (0.006)*** 
- 
-0.046 (0.030) 
-0.028 (0.002)*** 
- 
0.106 (0.010)*** 
0.060 (0.024)* 
-0.019 (0.007)** 
 
0.002 (0.081) 
0.030 (0.081) 
-0.499 (0.503) 
1.254 (0.120)*** 
0.201 (0.217) 
0.458 (0.132)*** 
 
0.251 (0.119)* 
0.209 (0.048)*** 
-0.053 (0.057) 
-0.043 (0.041) 
 
-0.122 (0.040)** 
-0.237 (0.079)** 
0.001 (0.014) 
-0.013 (0.013) 
0.306 (0.034)*** 
0.142 (0.022) 
-0.282 (0.040)*** 
-0.056 (0.196) 
0.098 (0.113) 
-0.083 (0.016)*** 
-0.046 (0.014)** 
- 
- 
0.007 (0.009) 
-0.020 (0.002)*** 
1.131 (0.137)*** 
0.020 (0.004)*** 
0.244 (0.015)*** 
0.020 (0.003)*** 
 
-0.026 (0.017) 
-0.027 (0.014) 
-0.046 (0.036) 
-0.092 (0.035)** 
-0.009 (0.030) 
-0.055 (0.037) 
 
-0.241 (0.052)*** 
-0.134 (0.015)*** 
-0.187 (0.018)*** 
-0.149 (0.013)*** 
 
0.064 (0.012)*** 
0.054 (0.027)* 
0.004 (0.005) 
0.012 (0.003)*** 
-0.015 (0.006)* 
0.125 (0.005)*** 
0.054 (0.012)*** 
0.059 (0.021)** 
0.017 (0.019) 
0.056 (0.004)*** 
0.027 (0.006)*** 
0.011 (0.003)*** 
0.077 (0.005)*** 
      
Between 
level 
coefficients 
(short-term 
analysis 
model) 
Herfindahl (W6) 
Herfindahl (W7-W6) 
GDP (W6) 
GDP (W7-W6) 
Social inequality (W6) 
Social inequality (W7-W6) 
Government Stability (W6) 
Government Stability (W7-W6) 
Internal Conflict (W6) 
Internal Conflict (W7-W6) 
Contact (W7) 
Trust (W7) 
0.428 (0.243) 
2.034 (2.100) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.344 (0.737) 
-6.428 (1.749)*** 
0.021 (0.003)*** 
0.072 (0.042) 
-0.883 (2.086) 
-4.564 (2.175)* 
-0.045 (0.105) 
-0.181 (0.104) 
0.096 (0.070) 
0.068 (0.225) 
0.024 (0.006)*** 
- 
2.300 (0.917)* 
7.595 (4.769) 
0.021 (0.004)*** 
0.008 (0.053) 
-2.261 (3.669) 
-0.086 (3.001) 
-0.416 (0.156)** 
-0.041 (0.128) 
-0.008 (0.140) 
-0.140 (0.323) 
- 
- 
-0.311 (0.150)* 
1.253 (0.658) 
0.005 (0.001)*** 
0.034 (0.011)** 
0.878 (0.732) 
0.892 (0.773) 
0.025 (0.035) 
-0.006 (0.022) 
-0.020 (0.031) 
0.141 (0.055)* 
0.011 (0.003)*** 
0.077 (0.005)*** 
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Variables 
 Trust Intergroup  
contact 
Quality of  
life 
Between 
level 
coefficients 
(long-term 
analysis 
model) 
Herfindahl (W1) 
Herfindahl (W7-W1) 
GDP (W1) 
GDP (W7-W1) 
Social inequality (W1) 
Social inequality (W7-W1) 
Government Stability (W1) 
Government Stability (W7-W1) 
Internal Conflict (W1) 
Internal Conflict (W7-W1) 
Contact (W7) 
Trust (W7) 
0.382 (0.225) 
2.159 (0.541)** 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.979 (0.453)* 
-1.626 (0.664)* 
0.031 (0.010)** 
0.021 (0.009)* 
-0.145 (1.740) 
4.084 (2.921) 
-0.255 (0.119)* 
-0.177 (0.114) 
0.005 (0.090) 
-0.052 (0.124) 
0.024 (0.006)*** 
2.730 (0.474)*** 
3.984 (0.710)*** 
0.016 (0.009) 
0.019 (0.004)*** 
-4.463 (0.983)*** 
4.396 (1.950)* 
0.154 (0.129) 
0.121 (0.069) 
-0.061 (0.062) 
-0.551 (0.102)*** 
- 
- 
-0.197 (0.145) 
0.536 (0.279) 
0.004 (0.003) 
0.003 (0.003) 
0.783 (0.383)* 
-0.022 (0.669) 
-0.028 (0.038) 
-0.021 (0.045) 
0.002 (0.018) 
0.084 (0.027)** 
0.011 (0.003)*** 
0.077 (0.005)*** 
Unexplained
variance 
Short-term 
Long-term 
 
 
 
 
 
0.067 (0.016) 
0.052 (0.013) 
 
 
0.083 (0.019) 
0.085 (0.028) 
 
 
0.202 (0.043) 
0.059 (0.021) 
 
 
0.007 (0.002) 
0.008 (0.002) 
Fit indicators 
   Short-term 
 
 
   Long-term 
 
Loglikelihood 
Akaike inform. criterion (AIC) 
Bayesian inform. criterion (BIC) 
Loglikelihood 
Akaike inform. criterion (AIC) 
Bayesian inform. criterion (BIC) 
 
9.6011 
92 195 
92 238 
9.5267 
92 189 
92 232 
 
3.6216 
327 032 
328 052 
3.5937 
327 009 
328 029 
Sample size 
(Countries; 
respondents) 
  
21; 
40,183 
 
21; 
33,719 
Note. The upper panel shows the coefficients from the individual-level data that is based on the 
ESS wave 7 and thus the same for both short- and long-term models. The lower panels indicate 
the results of the short-term and long-term models. * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001 
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Table S9. Full hypothesized model testing the effects of religious diversity on quality of life with alternative diversity indices.  
 
 
Note. Within-level coefficients are omitted from this table as they were the same as in our main analysis (Tables S4, S5, and S6).                         
† P < 0.060; * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001.
 
 
Variables 
Quality of life 
 
WVS ESS LB 
Between 
level 
coefficients 
Shannon index (average) 
Shannon index (change) 
Evenness index (average) 
Evenness index (change) 
 
Wave 
GDP (average) 
GDP (change) 
GINI (average) 
GINI (change) 
Government Stability (average) 
Government Stability (change) 
Internal Conflict (average) 
Internal Conflict (change) 
0.019 (0.044) 
-0.168 (0.086)† 
- 
- 
 
0.036 (0.013)** 
0.854 (0.221)*** 
0.136 (0.205) 
0.023 (0.019) 
0.010 (0.006) 
-0.039 (0.027) 
0.005 (0.007) 
-0.007 (0.022) 
0.016 (0.011) 
- 
- 
-0.219 (0.208) 
0.117 (0.240) 
 
0.028 (0.014)* 
0.833 (0.232)*** 
0.095 (0.199) 
0.030 (0.020) 
0.011 (0.006)† 
-0.040 (0.026) 
0.003 (0.008) 
0.001 (0.023) 
0.014 (0.012) 
-0.070 (0.063) 
-0.503 (0.166)** 
- 
- 
 
0.033 (0.015)* 
0.527 (0.193)** 
-0.271 (0.170) 
-0.001 (0.005) 
-0.007 (0.005) 
0.001 (0.031) 
-0.008 (0.014) 
-0.013 (0.019) 
0.046 (0.032) 
- 
- 
-0.098 (0.353) 
-0.394 (0.293) 
 
0.025 (0.015) 
0.556 (0.193)** 
-0.168 (0.171) 
-0.004 (0.004) 
-0.004 (0.005) 
-0.002 (0.032) 
0.005 (0.015) 
-0.027 (0.014)† 
0.044 (0.031) 
-0.158 (0.290) 
-0.776 (0.314)* 
- 
- 
 
0.010 (0.021) 
0.004 (0.025) 
0.002 (0.018) 
-0.025 (0.019) 
-0.085 (0.035)* 
0.088 (0.135) 
0.029 (0.027) 
0.001 (0.069) 
-0.033 (0.072) 
- 
- 
-5.270 (3.557) 
-0.335 (1.109) 
 
0.009 (0.021) 
0.004 (0.022) 
-0.029 (0.025) 
-0.021 (0.020) 
-0.089 (0.039)* 
0.104 (0.118) 
0.038 (0.024) 
0.020 (0.067) 
-0.036 (0.068) 
Unexplained 
variance 
  
0.020 (0.006) 
 
0.020 (0.006) 
 
0.009 (0.003) 
 
0.010 (0.004) 
 
0.060 (0.012) 
 
0.058 (0.010) 
Fit indicators 
 
 
Loglikelihood 
Akaike inform. criterion (AIC) 
Bayesian inf. criterion (BIC) 
9.3418 
1 497 311 
1 498 240 
9.3328 
1 497 314 
1 498 243 
11.2737 
1 246 939 
1 247 865 
11.2445 
1 246 947 
1 247 873 
3.2155 
139 254 
139 537 
3.2233 
139 252 
139 535 
Sample  
size 
Countries; country-waves; 
Respondents 
68; 145; 
179, 306 
68; 145; 
179, 306 
27; 70; 
126, 634 
27; 70; 
126, 634 
18; 71; 
51, 401 
18; 71; 
51, 401 
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Table S10. Full hypothesized model examining effects of religious diversity on quality of life 
controlling for proportion of individuals with no religion across the three surveys. 
 
 
Note. Within-level coefficients are omitted from this table as they were the same as in our main 
analysis (Tables S4, S5, and S6).  * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables 
WVS ESS LB 
Between 
level 
coefficients 
Herfindahl (average) 
Herfindahl (change) 
 
Wave 
GDP (average) 
GDP (change) 
GINI (average) 
GINI (change) 
Government Stability (average) 
Government Stability (change) 
Internal Conflict (average) 
Internal Conflict (change) 
Proportion of “no-religion” 
-0.014 (0.082) 
-0.432 (0.192)* 
 
0.026 (0.014) 
0.894 (0.227)*** 
0.206 (0.226) 
0.025 (0.019) 
0.011 (0.007) 
-0.045 (0.028) 
0.001 (0.007) 
-0.010 (0.022) 
0.015 (0.011) 
0.165 (0.116) 
-0.144 (0.137) 
-1.000 (0.392)* 
 
0.029 (0.014)* 
0.538 (0.199)** 
-0.286 (0.170) 
-0.001 (0.005) 
-0.005 (0.005) 
0.003 (0.031) 
-0.003 (0.011) 
-0.009 (0.020) 
0.035 (0.032) 
0.140 (0.172) 
0.459 (0.546) 
-1.547 (0.645)* 
 
0.009 (0.020) 
0.017 (0.027) 
0.011 (0.018) 
-0.032 (0.019) 
-0.090 (0.034)** 
0.065 (0.133) 
0.017 (0.025) 
-0.040 (0.065) 
-0.041 (0.068) 
-30.768 (16.123) 
Unexplained 
variance 
  
0.019 (0.007) 
 
0.008 (0.003) 
 
0.058 (0.010) 
Fit indicators Loglikelihood 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
Bayesian inform. criterion (BIC) 
9.5129 
1 377 931 
1 378 740 
12.9371 
1 353 466 
1 354 255 
3.3823 
124 172 
123 915 
Sample  
size 
Countries; country-waves; 
Respondents 
68; 142; 
160, 645 
27; 70; 
126, 634 
18; 71; 
51, 401 
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Table S11. Full hypothesized model examining effects of religious diversity on quality of life 
controlling for additional relevant contextual variables.         
 
  
Variables 
WVS ESS LB 
Between 
level 
coefficients 
Herfindahl (average) 
Herfindahl (change) 
 
Wave 
GDP (average) 
GDP (change) 
GINI (average) 
GINI (change) 
Government Stability (average) 
Government Stability (change) 
Internal Conflict (average) 
Internal Conflict (change) 
Life expectancy (average) 
Life expectancy (change) 
Inflation (average) 
Inflation (change) 
Corruption (average) 
Corruption (change) 
Unemployment (average) 
Unemployment (change) 
Population size (average) 
Population size (change) 
0.010 (0.080) 
-0.292 (0.130)* 
 
-0.011 (0.018) 
0.218 (0.186) 
0.121 (0.181) 
0.030 (0.017) 
0.001 (0.006) 
-0.049 (0.025) 
0.002 (0.008) 
-0.027 (0.021) 
0.009 (0.012) 
0.003 (0.005) 
0.030 (0.011)** 
0.001 (0.001) 
0.001 (0.001) 
-0.068 (0.025)** 
-0.005 (0.018) 
-0.008 (0.004) 
-0.001 (0.004) 
0.001 (0.001) 
0.001 (0.001) 
-0.054 (0.080) 
-0.507 (0.248)* 
 
0.028 (0.011)* 
-0.026 (0.113)      
-0.329 (0.147)*      
-0.003 (0.005)      
0.001 (0.005)      
0.048 (0.022)*       
-0.020 (0.011)      
-0.048 (0.018)**      
0.031 (0.022)       
0.008 (0.007)       
0.012 (0.013)       
-0.023 (0.012)      
-0.007 (0.005)      
-0.038 (0.020)       
0.046 (0.033)      
-0.008 (0.006)      
-0.013 (0.004)**      
-0.001 (0.001) 
-0.015 (0.020)   
0.185 (0.062)**       
-0.064 (0.029)*  
     
-0.070 (0.074)      
0.071 (0.038)       
0.021 (0.018)       
-0.015 (0.033)      
0.016 (0.053)       
0.033 (0.082)       
-0.012 (0.030)      
-0.120 (0.064)      
-0.008 (0.029)      
0.100 (0.061) 
0.085 (0.077)       
0.062 (0.047)       
0.030 (0.022) 
0.181 (0.034)***      
0.019 (0.020)      
0.029 (0.040)       
-0.110 (0.056)*     
    -0.089 (0.043)*      
    -0.004 (0.035)      
Unexplained 
variance 
  
0.010 (0.005) 
 
0.003 (0.001) 
 
0.025 (0.006) 
Fit indicators Loglikelihood 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
Bayesian inform. criterion (BIC) 
7.9018 
1 318 960 
1 320 007 
10.3056 
1 246 890 
1 247 913 
2.6357 
135 603 
135 975 
Sample  
size 
Countries; country-waves; 
respondents 
68; 141; 
158, 674 
27; 70; 
126, 634 
18; 71 
51, 401 
 
Note. Within-level coefficients are omitted from this table as they were the same as in our main 
analysis (Tables S4, S5, and S6).  * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001. 
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Table S12. Full hypothesized model testing effects of religious diversity on quality of life with the WVS, ESS, and LB for Catholics 
and the other religious groups.  
 
Note. Within-level coefficients are omitted from this table as they were the same as in our main analysis (Tables S4, S5, and S6).             
* P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
WVS ESS LB 
Catholics Other Catholics Other Catholics Other 
Between 
level 
coefficients 
Herfindahl (average) 
Herfindahl (change) 
 
Wave 
GDP (average) 
GDP (change) 
GINI (average) 
GINI (change) 
Government Stability (average) 
Government Stability (change) 
Internal Conflict (average) 
Internal Conflict (change) 
0.068 (0.102) 
-0.492 (0.222)* 
 
0.057 (0.018)** 
1.041 (0.270)*** 
-0.043 (0.287) 
0.017 (0.020) 
0.013 (0.006)* 
-0.060 (0.030)* 
0.001 (0.010) 
-0.034 (0.021) 
0.005 (0.013) 
0.004 (0.077) 
-0.392 (0.184)* 
 
0.023 (0.014) 
0.844 (0.231)*** 
0.200 (0.214) 
0.028 (0.019) 
0.013 (0.006)* 
-0.045 (0.028) 
0.001 (0.007) 
-0.005 (0.023) 
0.016 (0.011) 
-0.056 (0.109) 
-0.484 (0.552) 
 
0.025 (0.018) 
0.483 (0.199)* 
-0.260 (0.208) 
0.002 (0.006) 
-0.001 (0.006) 
-0.006 (0.034) 
-0.006 (0.020) 
-0.018 (0.028) 
0.047 (0.053) 
-0.096 (0.117) 
-0.893 (0.400)* 
 
0.033 (0.012)** 
0.495 (0.196)* 
-0.350 (0.163)* 
-0.004 (0.005) 
-0.008 (0.004)* 
0.008 (0.030) 
0.004 (0.012) 
-0.007 (0.020) 
0.031 (0.030) 
0.293 (0.501) 
-1.445 (0.600)* 
 
0.007 (0.019) 
0.018 (0.026) 
0.004 (0.019) 
-0.030 (0.019) 
-0.089 (0.034)** 
0.063 (0.024) 
0.022 (0.024) 
-0.036 (0.064) 
-0.040 (0.066) 
0.245 (0.578) 
-1.706 (0.854)* 
 
0.003 (0.023) 
0.020 (0.030) 
0.051 (0.018)** 
-0.025 (0.020) 
-0.084 (0.036)* 
0.038 (0.140) 
0.029 (0.033) 
-0.010 (0.073) 
-0.063 (0.077) 
Unexplained 
variance 
  
0.024 (0.008) 
 
0.019 (0.007) 
 
0.005 (0.003) 
 
0.008 (0.004) 
 
0.057 (0.011) 
 
0.064 (0.012) 
Fit indicators Loglikelihood 
Akaike inform. criterion (AIC) 
Bayesian infor. criterion (BIC) 
5.7329 
379 341 
380 014 
8.7250 
957 529 
958 272 
5.7700 
407 344 
408 008 
13.5993 
839 594 
840 314 
2.9675 
111 687 
111 928 
2.1135 
27 691 
27 893 
Sample  
size 
Countries; country-waves; 
Respondents 
62; 127; 
46, 010 
68; 142; 
114, 635 
26; 67; 
41, 319 
27; 70; 
85, 315 
18; 71; 
41, 359 
18; 71; 
10, 042 
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Fig. S1. Left panel: Paths of the predicted mediation model. Right panel: Unstandardized 
regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for the indirect effects, total indirect 
effect, and total effect. * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect effects 
Short-term 
changes 
Long-term 
changes 
 
 
Via trust 
(a*a’) 
 
 
 
Via contact 
(b*b’) 
 
 
 
Via contact and trust 
(b*d*a’) 
 
 
 
Total indirect 
(a*a’ + b*b’ + b*d*a’) 
 
 
-0.496*** 
(0.129) 
 
 
 
0.086 
(0.058) 
 
 
 
0.014 
(0.009) 
 
 
 
-0.395* 
(0.165) 
 
 
-0.126* 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
0.045** 
(0.013) 
 
 
 
0.007** 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
-0.073 
(0.055) 
Total effect  
(a*a’ + b*b’ + a*d*b’ + c) 
0.858  
(0.652) 
0.464  
(0.314) 
Diversity 
change 
Trust 
Quality  
of life 
Intergroup 
contact 
Trust 
Quality  
of life 
Intergroup 
contact 
Individual level: 
Country level: 
d 
b’ 
a’ 
c 
b 
a a’ 
b’ 
d 
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-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Unstandardized regression coefficients
Gap between 
waves 
(in years) 
Unstandardized 
regression 
coefficients 
 
6y (2008-14) 
10y (2004-14) 
16y (1998-14) 
20y (1994-14) 
30y (1984-14) 
 
 
-0.493 (0.248)* 
-0.066 (0.207) 
0.018 (0.275) 
-0.341 (0.188) 
-0.347 (0.250) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S2.  World Values Survey: Unstandardized regression coefficients of changes in religious 
diversity with standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.050. 
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Gap between 
waves 
(in years) 
Unstandardized 
regression 
coefficients 
 
2y (2013-15) 
4y (2011-15) 
5y (2010-15) 
6y (2009-15) 
7y (2008-15) 
8y (2007-15) 
9y (2006-15) 
10y (2005-15) 
11y (2004-15) 
12y (2003-15) 
13y (2002-15) 
14y (2001-15) 
 
-1.688 (0.666)* 
-2.476 (0.982)* 
1.889 (1.090) 
0.502 (0.843) 
1.195 (0.712) 
2.094 (1.068) 
1.845 (0.939)* 
1.313 (0.590)* 
-0.371 (0.857) 
-0.038 (0.393) 
0.357 (0.361) 
0.771 (0.687) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. S3.  Latino Barometro: Unstandardized regression coefficients of changes in religious 
diversity with standard errors in parentheses. * P < 0.050 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4 -2 0 2 4
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Fig. S4. An analysis of specified indirect effects via intergroup contact only and via intergroup 
contact and trust for all possible gaps. For a direct comparison of the different indirect effects, 
we depicted the z-scores (estimate/standard error) of each effect. * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010. 
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Fig. S5. Left panel: Paths of the reverse causal relationship between trust and intergroup contact. 
Right panel: Unstandardized regression coefficients (standard errors in parentheses) for the 
indirect effects, total indirect effect, and total effect. * P < 0.050; ** P < 0.010; *** P < 0.001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect effects 
Short-term 
changes 
 
Long-term 
changes 
 
 
Via trust 
(a*a’) 
 
 
 
Via contact 
(b*b’) 
 
 
 
Via trust and contact 
(a*d*b’) 
 
 
 
Total indirect 
(a*a’ + b*b’ + a*d*b’) 
 
 
-0.481*** 
(0.133) 
 
 
 
0.088 
(0.058) 
 
 
 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
-0.395* 
(0.165) 
 
 
-0.118* 
(0.050) 
 
 
 
0.046** 
(0.013) 
 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
-0.073 
(0.055) 
Total effect 
(a*a’ + b*b’ + a*d*b’ + c) 
0.858 
(0.652) 
0.464 
(0.314) 
Diversity 
change 
Trust 
Quality  
of life 
Intergroup 
contact 
Trust 
Quality  
of life 
Intergroup 
contact 
Individual level: 
Country level: 
d 
b’ 
a’ 
c 
 
 
b 
a a’ 
b’ 
d 
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